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Introduction
Bake Machou is a woman of about 35 years of age in North Benin1. She
belongs to the Fulani, a people of cattle keepers whoni you can meet every-
where in West Africa. Bake is married, but has no children. Her husband,
I'll call him Amadou, has a second, younger wife, who does have children.
Amadou has some cattle and grows sorghum, maize and cotton. They live,
together with Amadou's brother and his family, in a wuro, a compound in
a cattle keepers' camp near Alifiarou, 20 km from Kandi. Bake makes and
sells cheese. She earns about $ 0.75 per preparation cycle, i.e. on average
two or three times a week, in the rainy season only. But sometimes she
earns next to nothing. The grain to préparé meals she obtains from her
husband. With the money that she earns from cheese selling she covers her
personal expenditure for clothing, kerosene, jewellery and buys the ingre-
dients for the sauce she prepares for every meal. Because she does not have
to spend money on children, she has managed in the course of time to buy
some cattle, goats and sheep of her own. In the dry season, when there is
no milk, Bake has no income. She then depends on her husband.
(IJsendijk 1999).
Boureima is a rieh cattle trader from Malanville in North Benin^). He buys
cattle at the local markets. His apprentice takes care of the animals once
they are bought. When hè has bought 20 to 30 head after two or three
weeks, Boureima rents a truck and takes the cattle to Cotonou, a large city
700 km to the south. On the way hè has to bribe officials at least 7 road
blocks. At the cattle market in Cotonou Boureima sells his cattle to butch-
ers through a middleman. It may take a few weeks before all the cattle is
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sold and Boureima gets his money, but then hè has earned sorne $ 400. If
prices on the marker of Lomé, in neighbouringTogo, are berter, he unloads
his cattle some 200 km north of Cotonou and hires herders who trek the
cattle on the hoof secretly across the border. Boureima himself takes a taxi
to Lomé. If the market of Ibadan in Nigeria looks more profitable, he
sends the cattle across the border in North Benin, again on the hoof to stay
clear of customs. Then hè hires a truck in Nigeria to continue the journey.
Boureima also owns many cattle. These are herded by his family or friend-
ly cattle keepers. He donates much money to the mosque and hè has made
a pilgrimage to Mecca, hence his honorary title El Hadji (Quarles van
Ufford 1999a; 1999b).
(fig. l - Bake Machou's home and Boureima's trading routes)
Bake and Boureima live in what we have for a long time called the Third
World. Their life histories are examples of the diversity of livelihood and
prosperity we may find there.
In this paper I will argue in section l that the label "Third World" is not
appropriate any more. On the one hand, quite a number of countries have
reached an acceptable Standard of living. On the other hand, the diversity
in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has increased. Still
inherent in the development process is that some groups are included and
others are excluded. Therefore, processes of social inclusion and exclusion
remain in the focus of development studies.
In section 2, I will discuss how these processes of social inclusion and
exclusion should be studied. People's livelihood strategies will be taken as
a point of departure and then I will focus on actor-structure interactions.
In section 3, the efFects of today's globalisation on livelihood are discussed.
In section 4, I will determine the consequences for development studies,
by indicating the main research questions, the geographical area of research
and the need for comparison.
Chapter l - Does the Third World still exist?
What constituted the Third World was obvious to many of us some 40
years ago. It was the countries outside North America, Western Europe,
Australia and Japan and outside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In
this section I will show that the notion "Third World" is not appropriate
any more, but that social exclusion is still apparent on a large scale and
therefore remain the focus of development studies.
The name "Third World" originated in the 1950s by analogy with the
"Tiers Etat" in France before the Revolution. The "Tiers Etat" were the
poor, weakly developed population groups, exploited and oppressed by the
other classes: nobility and clergy (Kleinpenning 1978, p.4). "Third World"
was synonymous in the 1960s with "poor, hardly developed" and actually
also with "exploited and oppressed". The name gained popularity because
it also suggested a third road of development between the Western capi-
talist world, shown in blue in fig.2 3), and the Soviet Communist world,
of course, shown in red.
(fig. 2 - First (Western capitalist), Second (Soviet Communist)
and Third World in the 1960s)
People were, of course, aware of the differentiation in the Third World, but
the idea that the countries had more in common was widespread. Western
writers pointed in particular at the prevailing poverty and, therefore, the
need to improve the Standards of living. This unifying aspect was even
strengthened at the end of the 1960s by the rise of the "dependencia
theory" originating from Latin America. The "dependencia" theory
pointed more than previous theories at the unequal (the word is in fact
asymmetrical) incorporation of these countries into the world market as
the underlying cause of poverty. This asymmetry had already started in
colonial times, when Third World countries' economies became restruc-
tured to cater not for their own needs, but for those of the colonial
motherland. This dependency continued after politica! independence.
In this view, a line could be drawn through the world, dividing the domi-
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nant, capitalist countries of the centre from the dominated countries in the
periphery. The line was clear cut and ran along the Rio Grande between
the United States and Mexico, through the Mediterranean between
Western Europe and Africa, and then farther east across the Central Asian
mountain ranges.
Of course some questioned this supposed homogeneity of the Third
World. They pointed at differences in prosperity, dissimilar forms of
colonisation and of socio-economic Systems, and at the enormous cultural
heterogeneity. Others were convinced that countries like China and North
Korea and, later, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma and, still later,
Angola and Mozambique no longer belonged to the Third World, because
they had broken away from the asymmetrical relationship with the coun-
tries in the centre. These countries did not gained from immediately from
the break in terms of wealth, but it was claimed that the qualitative break-
through of dependency was a gain in itself (fig. 3).
(fig. 3 - The shrinking of the Third World - Unlinking China, North
Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Angola and Mozambique).
Moreover, a considerable improvement in the Standard of living was
achieved in a number of countries. In the dominant view of exploitation
of the periphery by the centre this was not considered to be possible. At
first, people spoke rather scathingly about the success of mini-states like
Hong Kong and Singapore, but soon other Asian Tigers or "Newly
Industrialising Countries" like Taiwan and South-Korea could no longer
be considered to belong to the Third World.
The interesting issue was that, contrary to the "dependencia" discussion,
the rise of Standards of living in these countries did not originale from
loosening the ties with the capitalist world market, but, was based on the
growth of a world market-oriented export industry.
Thanks to a sharp rise in prices of oil, a number of other countries experi-
enced a rapid growth in prosperity in the 1970s, too. Although, in some
countries, the newly acquired wealth disappeared like snow before the sun,
in others, especially in the Middle East, it proved to be sustainable (fig. 4).
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(fig. 4 - The shrinking of the Third World - Newly Industrialising
Countries: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea -
Oil States: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar,
United Arab Emirates, Libya, Gabon and Trinidad).
Thus, in the course of time, the Third World shrank. In addition, atten-
tion was drawn to poles of development in Third World countries.
Whether they were the export production zones of Mexico and Malaysia,
the metropoles of Brazil or the tourist areas of Turkey; they were said to be
little different from developed countries. Thus the image of the Third
World became even more fuzzy and more fragmented (fig. 5).
(fig. 5 - The shrinking of the Third World - Countries with
developed areas)
And then in 1989 the Berlin Wall feil and the Second World vanished
(fig. 6).
(fig. 6 - The exit of the Second World)
If I were to follow at this point of my presentation the American author
Fukuyama (1992) and his proposition about "The End of History", then
the whole world would soon have to be coloured blue on the map.
Fukuyama thinks that the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the end of the his-
tory of ideas and that there is no longer any alternative to western neolib-
eralism. In his view, the "Third World" as a road of development between
capitalism and communism no longer exists. Neither does hè consider
Islamic fundamentalism, Asian authoritarianism or nationalism to be
serious alternatives. He thinks that economy and politics are inevitably
developing in the direction of a globalising free market and a liberal
democracy.
Others have greater difficulties in abandoning thinking about the world in
terms of power blocks. This perhaps explains the popularity of an author
who has pointed to potential new global dividing walls. I am referring to
Huntington (1993), who in his "Clash of Civilisations" considers the
interactions between cultures to be a new source of conflicts. Contrary to
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Fukuyama, he does not discern one world, but no fewer than eight large
civilisations between which conflicts may emerge. The most virulent fron-
tier is the one between the western Christian civilisation in Europe, North
America and Oceania and the Islamic civilisation that runs from Africa
through the Middle East to Indonesia. Then there are the Orthodox
Christian, encompassing the Greek and Slavic world, the African, the
Hindu-Indian, the Japanese and the Confucian civilisations.
Fukuyama and Huntington point at contradictory trends: the Former
draws our attention to a trend towards ideological unifbrmity; the latter
confronts us again with the wide cultural diversity in the world. However,
both pass over the large diffèrences in prosperity which still exist in the
world, and even increase.
Is a new demarcation of the Third World still meaningful? And which? If
member states of the European Union like Greece and Portugal are con-
sidered to be developed countries and we know that Mexico and South
Korea are now members of the OECD, which is generally considered to be
the Organisation of developed countries, then we should consider all the
countries classifïed by the World Bank as "upper-middle-income" and
"high-income countries" to be developed (World Bank 1999 -
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/class.htm). In that case, the
rest must then be considered as the Third World. This is fascinating,
because it means that, besides Mexico, Botswana, Malaysia, Chile,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Brazil and a few others are no longer relevant to
development studies. However, we do receive a few pungent cases in return
like Cuba, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and all the Central
Asian republics and China, because these are "lower middle-income coun-
tries".
Moreover, this theoretical exercise in classifying countries is based on only
one criterion, i.e. GNP per capita, which I think is biased. Since 1990,
UNDP (United Nations Development Program) has been trying with the
Human Development Index (HDI) to do justice to the view that develop-
ment is not only a matter of income or a decent Standard of living but also
of welfare. In addition to income, UNDP includes longevity and know-
ledge in its HDI. According to the latest HDI ranking, Costa Rica and
Argentina may reckon themselves among the developed countries, but
Hungary, Mexico and Saudi Arabia may not (UNDP 1999 -
http://www.undp.org/hdro/hdi.html). Thus, there is no automatic rela-
tionship between economie prosperity and human welfare.
I admit that this presentation of the shrinking Third World is only a rough
sketch and that there may be good arguments to skip some or add a few
more countries. However, a preliminary conclusion impose itself, one
which was already drawn by Harris (1986) in his "The End of the Third
World" 4). If the "Third World" ever existed, then it certainly does not
exist any more and all the other labels like "the developing countries" or
"the South" miss the point too, which is (1) that quite a number of coun-
tries have reached an acceptable Standard of living and (2) that the diver-
sity in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has increased.
Firstly, according to the Human Development Report of 1998 (UNDP
1998 - see for summary and main statistics http://www.undp.org/
hdro/98.htm) income in "low" and "middle-income countries" increased
by 250% between 1960 and 1995, against only 80% in "high-income
countries". Life expectancy increased from 46 to 62 years and infant mor-
tality decreased from 149 per thousand to 65. Between 1970 and 1995
illiteracy decreased from 52 to 30% and food consumption rose by 20%.
Secondly, and these are figures becoming increasingly significant for the
globalising world, in I960, the richest 20% of the world had 30 times the
income of the poorest 20%, but by 1995 the gap had increased to 82
times 5); illiteracy in rural areas is twice that in urban areas; the literacy of
women is 17% lower than that of men; women earn only 1/3 of the total
income, which means that men earn 2/3. Moreover, 1.3 billion people live
on an income of less than 1$ a day, 841 million are malnourished, 880
million have no access to health care, 885 million adults are illiterate
(UNDP 1998).
Therefore, if we put the poverty line, for the sake of convenience and not
without cynicism, at a monetary income equal to $ l purchasing power per
day, then 20% of the 6 billion people in the world live in poverty. If we
put the line at $2, then we are talking about as much as half of the world
population. Thus we have to conclude that, despite the progress made,
between 20% and 50% of the world population is excluded from this
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progress. This exclusion no longer relates to countries as a whole, but
rather to social groups and areas within countries. Moreover, it concerns
not only people in remote, exotic places, but also people not far from here:
in Albania or in Slovakia, and even in the metropolises closer to home.
Finally, we should be aware that, as a society's value system attaches less
importance to what a person can do or does and more to what hè or she
possesses or consumes, then consumption becomes a means of feeling or
becoming accepted by society. Social exclusion is a dynamic phenomenon.
Just as in the Netherlands, a schoolboy without a mobile phone hardly
counts and many municipal social services departments consider a televi-
sion set and a subscription to a newspaper to be primary needs, in India a
women is excluded from marriage where the level of a dowry is beyond the
means of her family. It is important to note that social Standards of con-
sumption tend to rise faster than incomes. What was considered a luxury
30 years ago is now a necessity. For example, in the 1960s, 16 out of every
1000 Japanese owned a car, but in the 1980s, when the same level of
income was reached in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Malaysia, car ownership
was between 50 to 64 per 1000 inhabitants, that is 3 or 4 times as much
(UNDP 1998, pp.59- 60).
Chapter 2 - Social Exclusion and Sustainable
Livelihood
What is still inherent in the development process, therefore, is that some
groups are included and others are excluded. Processes of social inclusion
and exclusion are part of the development process and, because develop-
ment studies, have, or at least should have, a normative preoccupation
with the poor and the marginalised, these processes should be in the focus
of our work. I will demonstrate in this section, elaborating on the concept
of sustainable livelihood as a point of departure and paying attention to
actor-structure interactions, how these processes of social inclusion and
exclusion can be studied.
The notion of "social exclusion" became populär in the politica! debate in
Western Europe and in the discussion of the underclass in the United
States. It refers to the lack of access to social security, to employment, to
safety, to human rights etc., in brief, to a decent living (ILO, 1996). In
development studies, this notion finds its parallel in the concept of sus-
tainable livelihood as the way in which people make themselves a living
using their capabilities and their tangible and intangible assets (Chambers
1995). Livelihood is sustainable if it is adequate for the satisfaction of self-
defined basic needs and proof against shocks and stresses. If livelihood is
sustainable, it is synonymous with social inclusion; if not, it equates with
social exclusion. I therefore find it important to elaborate on the concept
of sustainable livelihood. 6)
2.1 Livelihood
Livelihood is not necessarily the same as having a job and does not neces-
sarily even have anything to do with working. Moreover, although obtain-
ing a monetary income is an important part of livelihood, it is not the only
aspect that matters. It is quite conceivable for somebody with a low mone-
tary income to be better off than someone with a higher monetary income.
The poverty lines of $1 or $2 I referred to above have therefore to be
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treated with circumspection.
Generally, poor people undertake manifold activities which yield them
food, housing, money etc. The most common of these are the production
of crops, livestock, clothing and housing for home consumption; the pro-
duction of crops and livestock for sale; trade; handicrafts such as basket
weaving, pottery, carpentry; seasonal or permanent wage labour, which
includes children; remittances by kin who have emigrated; loans, alms,
gifts and sometimes corruption.
In Bake's compound all the crops and vegetables produced are consumed
at home. Bake's husband seldom sells cattle, although occasionally a sheep.
In fact, hè earns his money by growing cotton for the market. His second
wife is allowed to seil part of the milk production, the rest of the milk is
also consumed at home. Bake buys milk to produce cheese, which is her
main source of income. She also keeps some sheep and goats near the com-
pound and has a tiny vegetable garden. She obviously has a lot of house-
keeping to do, such as fetching water, washing clothes and cooking. The
family constructed their huts themselves and these are maintained by the
men. Last year her husband was asked by a peasant to look after his cow,
so this cow is included in the herd. The milk and every second calf from
this cow may be kept in return.
Boureima's livelihood is much more specialised, but also more complex.
He buys and sells cattle and lives on the profit. He buys cattle for cash at
the market place or in the cattle keepers compound. Sometimes hè bor-
rows money on them so that hè can later buy cattle at a cheaper price. He
also lends money to local authorities in order not to be troubled by them
with permits and regulations. Boureima supplies food and lodging to his
apprentice. He also needs money to pay truck drivers and herders for the
transport to the south and to bribe customs officials on the road. Part of
his own herd is looked after by a paid herder. The other part is taken care
of by family and friendly herders under the same conditions as described
above with reference to Bake's husband. Boureima had his house in
Malanville build by a mason.
He is a well respected and wealthy man and is expected to give alms to the
poor.
Following Blaikie et al. (1994), Chambers and Conway (1992), Chambers
(1995) and Carney (1999a), we may state that people need five vital
resources in order to achieve a sustainable a sustainable livelihood. We can
call those resources (1) "human", (2) "natural", (3) "physical", (4) "finan-
cial" and (5) "social" capita! 7):
1. human capital can be labour, but also skills, experience, knowledge,
creativity and inventiveness;
2. natural capital is resources like land, water, forests and pastures, but
also minerals;
3. physical capital can be food stocks, livestock, jewellery, equipment,
tools and machinery;
4. Financial capital is money in a savings account at the bank or in an old
sock, a loan or credit.
5. social capital concerns the quality of relations among people, for exam-
ple, whether one can count on support by family or mutual assistance
among neighbours. I will return to this topic later.
"Capital" does not necessarily have to be held in private property. Land,
water and forests can be communally owned. What matters is if one has
access to the resource when it is needed and wanted. Chambers and
Conway (1992) therefore distinguish, next to "resources" and "stores"
(cattle, equipment, stocks), which together constitute "tangible assets",
"non-tangible assets". "Non-tangible assets" consist of "claims" and
"access". By "claims" they mean that people can call upon moral and prac-
tical assistance. "Access" means having or getting the opportunity to use
the resource in practice. Thus it refers to the real opportunity for women
to gather firewood in the forest or for men to use water for Irrigation from
the village well. According to Chambers (1995), it also refers to the possi-
bility for women to obtain food from the compound's granary, or the
access by men to Information about prices for cattle or the possibilities for
temporary wage labour elsewhere in the region.
Among the Fulani, men do the milking. They determine how much milk
to leave for the calves; the rest is distributed amongst the women of the
family. The quantity of milk a women receives depends, among other
things, on how many children she has. Bake has no children, but she
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received enough milk to be able to seil some of it. Then, when the children
of her husband's second wife were old enough to milk the cattle of their
father s herd, they gave preference to their mother over Bake in distribut-
ing the milk. Bake therefore did not have any milk left to seil, so that she
was deprived of her traditional source of income.
Blaikie et al. (1994) has elaborated the access aspect further in an "access
model to maintain livelihood". According to him, every Household and
every member of it has a certain access profile to resources and tangible
assets which depend on one's rights , for example, property rights, by tra-
dition or by law. They differ per individual and per household and they
may also change over time. Each actor (household, individual) decides on
a choice of livelihood strategies on the basis of his access. The "access
model" resembles Sen's "entitlement" (Sen 1981; Drèze and Sen 1989).
The "endowment" and "entitlement" of actors are central in Sen's view.
"Endowment" refers to owned assets and personal capacities through
which an "entitlement" to food can be exercised. "Entitlement" is the way
in which access to food is obtained, for example, by producing it with
endowments like land, skill and plough; by selling labour or cash crops to
buy food; by transfer of food or money through gifts and loans.
Many authors have applied Sen's "entitlement" approach to fïelds of social
interaction other than food security, such as to the exploitation of natura!
resources (cf. Dietz 1996) «). Blaikie et al. (1994, p. 88) value the concept
as well, despite their criticism that Sen's initial notion to perceive endow-
ments and entitlements was static and given, and their observation that it
caused a constriction in the debate on famine by neglecting its multi-
causality.
We may conclude that "access and claims" come close to "social capita!",
because if social capita! in the broadest sense "includes the institutions, the
relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among
people and contributes to economie and social development" (World Bank
1998, p.l), then the access to a resource could also be considered as part
of social capita!. Having acknowledged this, I nevertheless include "access"
as a separate, because fundamental, element in my conceptual model, that
determines the real use of "vital capitals".
Carney (1999a) explains that there are various views on social capital, but
that the following core elements can be distinguished: (1) relations of trust,
reciprocity and exchange between individuals, (2) connectedness, net-
works and groups, including access to wider institutions and, (3) common
rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or handed down within socie-
ties. In my view, social capital concerns mutual help from neighbours,
religious organisations, resource user groups, political parties etc. These are
all manifestations of mutual engagements of people and, therefore, of
importance to livelihood.
For Boureima trust is the key element in his management of relations.
"Mutual trust is of utmost importance given the nature of his activities.
Boureima must be able to count on the herders who drive his cattle across
the border to do their job carefully. After all, they are being entrusted with
a considerable and not insurable (physical) capital. He also has to trust that
his middleman in Cotonou will do his best to judge the creditworthiness
of the butchers and does everything to collect the outstanding credits. In
their turn, the apprentice, herders and middleman have to trust Boureima
to work with them again the next time. In the cattle trade there are no con-
tracts, because of the absence of sanctions, trust is crucial" (Quarles van
Ufford 1999a, p. 28).
I propose to use the notion "capital" for the five vital fïelds that livelihood
rests upon, firstly because it puts on a par various terms like "resource",
"asset (tangible or non-tangible)" and "capital" and brings them together
under a common denominator. Secondly, it draws a parallel with the dis-
cussion on social capital. The notion "capital" is an economie metaphor
according to Carney (1999a), which does not do justice to the nature of
social relationships which are not entirely oriented towards material gain.
However, material gains are a very important aim in the notion of liveli-
hood. Thirdly, even with respect to non-material motives and aims, it is
possible and useful to apply terms like opportunities, Investments and
gains in order to arrive at a better understanding of livelihood strategies. I
shall therefore continue to use the notion of "capital".
(Fig. 7 - Actors'livelihood strategies and five vital "capitals")
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In the long run, the livelihood of actors such as individuals, households
and other social groups constitutes a "livelihood system". In classic French
geography a livelihood system was called "genre de vie" (Claval 1974), i.e.
a system of livelihood strategies of a human group in a specific region in
which the interaction of society with the natural environment was empha-
sised. However, a livelihood system was not seen as inevitably determined
by the natural environment. Social reality and force of habit were con-
sidered to be more important. Nevertheless a "genre de vie" was considered
as a unity of interaction of livelihood strategies with the natural environ-
ment and because of that it had a clear, spatial identity, called the region.
The present view of a livelihood system is broader and more dynamic. In
the 19th Century one could write about the French regions as more or less
independent units, nowadays livelihood, even in the remotest corners of
the world, experiences a multitude of influences from a broader national
and international economie, social and political context. Moreover, the
man-natural resources perspective has broadened into an interaction with
various types of resources as indicated above, so that a livelihood system
can no longer be regarded as a more or less closed regional system, but
much more as a "complex ensemble of generically heterogeneous factors
on various spatial levels of scale: natural and social, internal and external,
historical and actual" (Kleinpenning 1997). What has remained is the view
that livelihood Systems are a social reality which, by force of habit, experi-
ence a certain inertia, so that it is sometimes hardly possible to reconstruct
how they came into being (CASL 1998). Livelihood strategies are rooted
in this social reality.
In figure 8 the five vital "capitals" are thus influenced by a social, eco-
nomie, political and natural context. Note that, in this preliminary pres-
entation, the context is undifferentiated and that the five vital "capitals" are
basically described in a local context.
(Fig. 8 - Preliminary presentation of livelihood and context)
2.2 Coping and adaptive strategies
As indicated above, livelihood is sustainable if it is capable of adequately
satisfying basic needs and securing people against shocks and stresses.
Shocks are violent and come unexpectedly; stress is less violent, but can last
longer. Both have their impact on one or more of the vital "capitals". An
environmental shock like a flood or an earthquake has its impact on natu-
ral, human and physical capital. Drought is an example of a high-level
environmental stress; seasonality is a well-known example of low-level
environmental stress. A second source of shocks and stresses is the eco-
nomy. Devaluation can raise prices of imported goods drastically, but may,
at the same time, increase the attractiveness of growing certain export
crops. Price policies aiming at low food prices in the cities may chronically
frustrate the income generation of food producers in rural areas. A third
source of shocks and stresses is politics, with violent conflict as an unfor-
tunately not uncommon extreme.
An important contribution to the understanding of how these shocks have
their differential impact on livelihood strategies was made in the 1980s by
Sen (1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). He noticed that a erop failure caused by
drought or some other reason resuked in famine only under certain con-
ditions. A drought results in a famine only when people run out of stock,
do not have good relations with others to borrow food, do not find
employment to earn money to buy food, or when their savings are gone.
Despite increasing food prices caused by scarcity, malfunctioning markets
are not able to attract enough food from elsewhere. Sometimes food is
being exported from famine areas, because there is a lack of purchasing
power. Sometimes it is not drought or flooding that triggers famine, but
forced food deliveries to the government. Thus, according to Sen, it is not
only the limited access of actors to "vital capitals" that causes famines, but
also impacts stemming from a broader social, economie, political and
natural context.
Because of contextual shocks and stresses, livelihood strategies temporarily
take the shape of safety mechanisms called "coping strategies". These are
short-term responses to secure livelihood in periods of shocks and stress.
They do not appear out of the blue, but are specific manifestations of the
livelihood. In periods of hunger, food stocks are opened up and, if these
are used up, assets like jewellery or cattle are sold and livestock keepers
migrate to wetter areas. In periods of economie crisis people are inclined
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to save and to develop alternative sources of income, for example, by
migrating to the city. The collection of wild food and hunting are very old
coping strategies; while relying on international disaster relief is a modern
one.
Coping strategies are thus short-term or temporary responses to external
shocks and stresses. Depending on the severity and length of the latter,
coping strategies fade away and normal livelihood strategies return.
However, this type of equilibrium thinking is often no longer adequate for
a proper understanding of livelihood strategies. The contextual impact of
climatic change, world market and politics is growing stronger and shocks
and stresses appear more frequently, so that it is becoming important to
shape the coping strategies more permanently. Thus temporary coping
mechanisms develop into more permanent "adaptive strategies". In the
view of CASL (Community Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods -
1998, p.2), adaptive strategies result in an adapted livelihood, then the idea
of adaptation vanishes and the adaptive strategy is considered to be a nor-
mal livelihood strategy. I am inclined to think that, at present, new coping
and adaptive strategies will have to be developed as responses to new
shocks and stresses, even before stability in livelihood as a result of a pre-
vious adaptation has come within reach.
It becomes clear from the above discussion that "sustainable livelihood
thinking" is rather locally biased. The way shocks and stresses are perceived
is almost exclusively extra-local. Their impact runs through the five vital
"capitals" to livelihood and adaptive strategies. I think this notion should
be amended in order to help our conceptualisation. A drought, for
example, is a phenomenon on a macro-regional scale which is locally
manifested in lack of rainfall. Drought as a climatic phenomenon should
therefore be thought of as an extra-local level in natural capital, while soil
fertility is local. The same goes for social capital. We included above
"networks and groups, including access to wider institutions" and "politi-
cal parties" in social capital. These typically represent the higher levels of
scale in social capital. For these reasons, vital "capitals" in figure 9 are no
longer perceived monolithically as in figure 11, but levels of scale are
distinguished.
(Fig. 9 - Shocks, stress and coping mechanisms resulting in
adaptive strategies and new livelihood)
Bake's people, the Fulani, the same people from whom Boureima buys most
of his cattle, have been living in northern Benin since the 19th Century.
They originate from the Sahel. Up to the present time, groups of Fulani flee
to Benin from Burkina Faso, Niger or Nigeria because of drought or politi-
cal unrest. In the Sahel they were semi-nomadic pastoralists; their livelihood
was built on cattle and milk. They also grew grain in the Sahel, but with
variable success, because of the drier climate. From the day when they
arrived in North Benin with their thinned-out herds, or even without cattle,
erop cultivation became an important livelihood strategy. Despite the small
fields they were able to get, erop growing remained more important for
many of them than cattle keeping. Because of the importance of food crops,
their way of life and, therefore, their cattle keeping, has become more
sedentary. Practically spoken, they are more agro-pastoralists than they have
ever been before (De Haan 1997a). Nevertheless they look upon themselves
as pastoralists and their primary objective is the reconstitution of a large
herd.
Migration to other areas because of environmental shocks or stresses is a
well-known livelihood strategy of semi-nomadic pastoralists. Paying more
attention to erop cultivation because of the loss of cattle is seen as a tem-
porary solution, that is, as a coping strategy. For the Fulani in North Benin
agriculture eventually became an adaptive strategy. For those groups who
settled in the region a long time ago agro-pastoralism became a new liveli-
hood. However, population growth, the increasing importance of cash
crops, lack of pastures, conflicts with peasants, the demand for meat and
the rise of cattle markets will make new coping strategies necessary and will
eventually result in new adaptive strategies9).
2.3 Actors and structure
So far I have explained how actors use available and accessible "capitals" for
their livelihood strategies and the increased impact increased impact of
shocks and stresses. Many changes in livelihood strategies result from the
influence of external factors. However, livelihood strategies may also
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change as an consequence of internal influences, such as a drive for
increased prosperity and welfare. "Human agency" is the capacity of people
to integrate experiences into their livelihood strategies and to look for out-
lets for ambitions and solutions to problems. Human agency enables them
to reshape social conditions. Initially, we think of individual decision mak-
ing and the way individuals use vital "capitals", including the creation of
access and claims that they can really use these "capitals". However, social
behaviour cannot be understood only in terms of individual motives,
intentions and interests (Long 1992). We have learned from Bourdieu
(1977; 1990), Giddens (1984) and Long (1989, 1992) that
individual behaviour is socially constructed. "Agency" is embodied in the
individual, but embedded in social relations through which it can become
effective. Individual choices and decision making are embedded in values
and norms and institutional structures. Through "human agency" struc-
tures may change. "Agency" causes livelihood changes in the long run,
"agency" enables individuals and social groups, i.e. actors, to influence
structure; "agency" is the hinge between actor and structure.
Initially, the "sustainable livelihood" approach (Chambers and Conway
1992; Chambers 1995) was strongly actor-oriented and had all the charac-
teristics of the neo-populist view (Blaikie 1998) on development. Neo-
populism is characterised by an unconditional belief in the adaptive capa-
bilities of man, i.e. the human capacity to adapt repeatedly to changing cir-
cumstances and still to guarantee a sustainable exploitation of scarce
resources. The strong actor and micro-orientation results in much atten-
tion being paid to local or indigenous knowledge and local agendas with
which policy can adopt (De Haan 1999). This orientation is important,
but not sufficient. The "sustainable livelihood" approach has since become
more realistic (Hoon et al. 1997), notably in its recognition of structural
bottlenecks or even barriers and the necessary quest for a hinge between
structure and actor. Large donors like UNDP and DFID, the British
Department for International Development, and even the poverty reduc-
tion programme of the World Bank, have now embraced the approach.
They have recognised the structural bottlenecks, however they speak with
a so far unjustified optimism about their ability to enhance the sustain-
ability of livelihoods (Ashley and Carney 1999; Carney 1999b; see also
Amalric 1998).
The reciprocity between structure and actor is most clearly identified in
Hoon's et al. view of sustainable livelihood (Hoon et al. 1997, p.4).
According to the authors, livelihood strategies change because livelihood is
a dynamic domain that combines (1) opportunities and assets available to
a group of people to attain their goals and aspirations with (2) the inter-
action with and exposure to series of favourable or harmful ecological,
social, economie and political perturbations that may help or hinder a
group's capacity to make a living.
Individuals and social groups are considered by Hoon et al. to be in inter-
action with their environment. They are neither powerless objects nor free
agents who can become whatever they choose10). There are feedback loops
between actors themselves and between actor and the context in which
they live. The following story of Bake's carrier in cheese production illus-
trates at the micro-level the capacity of people to change structures as a
feedback mechanism to stress.
When Bake received too little milk to seil she was very discouraged. In
those days she often went to her uncle who lives in Parakou for money and
help. Then she started to spin cotton for traditional garments, but this was
not profitable. Next she started to buy small quantities of milk from other
women in her camp and sold it at a very small margin. Her secret was that
she first skimmed off the milk in order to keep the cream for herself. In
this way she did not have to buy oil for cooking. If the next day the milk
had become thick and sour, she mixed it with warm water to create more
milk and then sold in the neighbouring peasant village. She used a slightly
smaller measuring bowl than the other women did.
Then came the breakthrough: with some other women whose families had
lost all their cattle because of rinderpest, they asked a women from anoth-
er village to teach them how to make cheese. Fulani women are entitled to
seil part of the milk they receive from men. Cheese was already produced
in other parts of the region, but never by Fulani women. Hearing milk,
which is necessary in cheese making, is a strong taboo among Fulani. It
may cause bad luck to the herd. A real Fulani woman should not get
involved with cheese making, it is rather a craft for peasant women, who
were sometimes former slaves of the Fulani.
Despite the dishonour, Bake and her neighbours now make cheese,
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because it pays better than selling milk. There are always Fulani women
who do not have time to seil milk in the peasant village or who are not
allowed to leave the compound. These are the ones, Bake and her friends
buy their milk from. In the rainy season there is plenty of milk, but that is
also when a lot of cheese is produced, so there is a possibility that very little
money will be earned.
At the start Bake earned more from cheese production than she does now,
simply because more milk was available. Now more milk sellers have
started to produce cheese themselves. Others became jealous of the higher
incomes of the cheese makers and refused to seil milk to them any longer.
They spoke shame about the cheese makers because they did not respect
the taboo and started to ask more money for their milk. Fortunately, some
other women had pity on them and continued to seil their milk.
Finally, the quarrel was settled. It was agreed that fresh milk would no
longer be sold outside the women's own camp. A rotation System was
drawn up of which women could buy milk on which days to préparé
cheese. In the dry season, when the herds are pastured far away from the
village, they go in turns to the herds for milk. As a consequence, milk has
become a commodity, which always has its price and is no longer given as
a present or gift.
Sometimes Bake prefers to seil milk instead of making cheese. She says: "It
feels better for me, as a Fulani women, to walk the streets of Kandi with a
calabash of milk than with an enamel bowl of cheese. Cheese makers are
still considered poor" (IJsendijk 1999, p.56).
A question that remains is how to conceptualise impact and feedback loops
herween actor and structure. Structure should be perceived as the shell in
which the five "capitals" are embedded. The social part of "structure" con-
sists of the shell of common rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or
handed down, around social capital. The economie part includes market
structure, supply and demand; and the political structure contains power
relations. As I have already distinguished between different levels of scale
in vital "capitals", this can also be done with respect to structure (see fig.
10). For example, there are local and extra-local power relations structur-
ing livelihood strategies. The precise division between structure and "capi-
tals" is not easy to determine. "Capitals" are used by actors to "produce"
livelihood; structure determines the direction of the outcome, although
the direction may eventually change through the agency actor's livelihood
strategies.
(Fig. 10 - Agency in livelihood strategies)
Despite the success of Bake and her neighbours in cheese making, it is still
too early to call this livelihood sustainable. Nevertheless, her life history
clearly demonstrates that she has overcome her exclusion from milk distri-
bution in her extended family, although her livelihood remains vulnerable
like those of the other 1.3 to 3 billion people in the world I referred to
above. Why do some people manage to have a sustainable livelihood and
others not? Is it a matter of available capital and access to it, of fewer or
more shocks and stresses, of sufflcient or insufficient agency?
Gore's review of the literature (1994, pp.6-8) on social exclusion in Africa
is interesting in this respect. He concludes that there is an important split
between two types of studies on social exclusion. (1) The fïrst approach
interprets social exclusion as a mechanism by which elites exclude others
from access to resources with the objective of maximising their own
returns. Social exclusion in that view is a process in which social groups try
to monopolise specific, mostly economie, opportunities to their own
advantage. They often use certain social or physical characteristics such as
race, gender, language ethnicity, origin or religion to legitimise this insula-
tion of opportunities. Social exclusion is then the consequence of social
closure: a form of collective social action which gives rise to social cate-
gories of eligibles and ineligibles. (2) A second approach sterns from mar-
ginalisation studies. While, in the first view, exclusion literally means
"being excluded", in marginalisation studies it is rather "being left behind"
after a failed attempt to be included. Exclusion in the latter view is caused
by bottlenecks in the access to capital. In a historical perspective, a pattern
of social differentiation emerges between actors who succeeded in choos-
ing successful trajectories of upward mobility and those who did not. The
latter were left behind as others improved their position and were excluded
as a result (Gore 1994, p. 7).
Characterising the divide between these two points of view as a bifurcation
means that there is little exchange of fïndings and mutual testing. I agree
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with Gore (1994, p. 8) that a hinge between these two points of view
should be developed. Access to vital capital can always be denied, but this
does not block any possibility of agency on the part of the excluded. It
rather structures their field of action. For example, African governments
have tried for a long time to use price policies to reduce food prices in
order to privilege their urban rank and file at the cost of the farmers. This
had adversely affected farmers' incomes. However, because they started
selling food crops on illicit markets and smuggled produce across the bor-
der, it was eventually not the farmers, but the government that was stung.
Livelihood strategies engender processes of inclusion and exclusion: it is
important to note that the sustainable livelihood of one actor may result
in the social exclusion of another, or at least structure his of her field of
action.
Livelihood strategies are developed in an arena of conflicting or co-operat-
ing actors or, in the words of Olivier de Sardan (1993), in a "local politi-
cal arena". As Long (1992) notes, development workers and their projects
play an important role in the arena. Both Olivier de Sardan and Long are
interested in the articulation of development interventions with the local
population. Implicit assumptions about the rural and urban society, repre-
sentations and the more hidden agendas of the development workers
themselves and livelihood strategies of the local population make it diffi-
cult to plan or even foresee the outcome of development interventions. I
find the attention to differences among local actors, called strategie groups
by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk (1994), more attractive than Long's
approach. According to the authors strategie groups are not permanent
social groups who present themselves irrespective of the problem posed.
They are rather groups of differing composition who present themselves
depending on the problem. Sometimes it is an occupational group, some-
times it is a status group like women or youths, sometimes it is a kinship
group, sometimes a network of mutual assistance or clients of a patron,
and sometimes a group of individuals with a common historical trajectory
of livelihood strategies. Conflicting interests exist between these groups
which are fought out in the local political arena.
In view of the specific content which the concept of "strategie groups" has
been given in the past (Evers and Schiel 1988) and the looser portrayal by
Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, I prefer to use the term "interest
groups" n)-
It is important to note that livelihood strategies not only at the individual
level, but even more at higher levels of decision making, such as the house-
hold or the extended family, are not singular activities. They comprise a
large number of production and labour activities using vital "capitals" in
various compositions. Livelihood strategies are thus multiple. Depending
on their role, individuals belong to different interest groups and therefore
the dividing lines between individuals and between groups are never rigid,
but variable and fuzzy. General categories as "the local population" or "the
poor" do not exist. In the local arena of livelihood strategies, inclusion and
exclusion may differ in each dimension. 12)
In Bake's camp it was agreed that milk would no longer be sold outside the
camp and that a rotation System would determine which women could buy
milk and when. The rotation system divided the camp into three parts, in
fact, three extended families living in various wuro's. Within each kinship
group, which now acted as an interest group, two women of the group
could buy up the daily supply of milk; the next day two others. They were
not allowed to buy milk outside the interest group (IJsendijk 1999).
Finally, I have some notes on the "local nature" of the political arena. If
vital "capitals" are characterised by different scales and are being used in
livelihood strategies, then the political arena is, by definition, a local and
extra-local arena at the same time. Interest groups may include extra-locals,
and locals may use extra-locally situated capitals. Moreover, De Groots
argument that the analysis of livelihood strategies should not be narrowed
to direct "actor-to-actor" contacts only should be considered (De Groot
1992, p. 323). An actor's opportunities and choices are influenced by other
(distant, sometimes even global) actors' strategies without face-to-face con-
tacts occurring.
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Chapter 3 - The Importance of Locality and
Globalisation
In this section I propose to discuss the main features of today's globalisa-
tion considering the consequences for studying sustainable livelihoods and
j processes of social inclusion and exclusion. In particular I will examine the
* significance of locality.
3.1 Locality
Inevitably, natural resources occupy an important place in the sustainable
livelihood debate. Everywhere there is fear of environmental degradation,
everywhere attention is drawn to the need for sustainable prosperity, in
other words, it has become an article of faith to prevent depletion of nat-
ural resources while striving to increase prosperity. According to Hyden
(1998, p. 8), ecosystems should even be the point of departure for sus-
~„ tainable livelihood. With the attention being paid to natural resources,
locality is coming to occupy an important position in the debate about ^
livelihood and social exclusion, because natural resources tend to be place-
specific. Because of this and because many livelihood studies are actor-
oriented, a local orientation dominates.
However, it has become clear from the previous section that the local
arena should also be considered in a wider perspective. I have already indi-
cated elsewhere (De Haan 1999, p. 15; 1995, p. 122) how to go beyond
the local level, notably "by studying how the adaptive capabilities of actors
are influenced, restricted or stimulated by Integration in larger social-cul-
tural, economie and political-cultural, economie and politica! entities...".
"After all, the need for increase in prosperity coupled with sustainable
exploitation of natural resources can only be understood (and this remark
does not apply only to "low-income countries") if increasing inter-
dependence and globalisation are accounted for."
It is interesting in this connection to consider Bookfield's (1992) "nested
hierarchy" approach. Taking the example of sustainable agriculture, hè
explains that the agronomic sustainability of the field has to fit into a sus-
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tainable exploitation of the farm as a whole. In the application of fallow
and rotation a sustainable exploitation of the field's soil can be achieved
that cannot be achieved at the individual level of the field. Sustainable
exploitation at the farm level should fit into that of the agro-ecological
zone or river basin. Take, for example, soil and water conservation meas-
ures such as terracing or irrigation, which can only yield sustainable effects
if organised at an extra-farm level of scale. Staying with Brookfield, envi-
ronmental policy should also be organised at the regional level.
This is also how the complex relationships between the local arena and the
context can be perceived. However, I have reservations about Brookfield's
plea for the regional level as the most suitable level for analysis of liveli-
hood, as national and international levels are now becoming increasingly
important. Nevertheless, I will show below that, because of globalisation,
these higher levels of scale are more closely approaching the regional level
than ever before. Moreover, it is questionable whether the notion of nested
hierarchy is still valid. As I have already explained, livelihood strategies are
not only multiple, but increasingly multi-local.
Bake's livelihood strategies are multiple in the sense that (l) cheese making
is her main activity, (2) her husband provides her with food and housing,
although she also produces some of these subsistence goods herself, (3) she
was supported for some time by her uncle in the city. Her livelihood strate-
gies have only a limited range and take place in the camp where she lives
(and buys her milk and produces her cheese), the nearby peasant village of
Alifïarou and the town of Kandi 20 km farther on, where she sells her
cheese.
Boureima's livelihood strategies are more specialised, although hè is a trad-
er as well as a cattle owner, because hè has invested in herds. However, his
strategies are much more complex spatially and range from cattle markets
in northern Benin to the butchers and abattoirs of Lomé, Cotonou and
Ibadan.!3)
3.2 Globalisation
I expect the multi-locality of livelihood strategies to become increasingly
important in the present era of globalisation. I will therefore first examine
the phenomenon of globalisation and then will return to its consequences
for livelihood strategies.
Globalisation is said to be financial flash capital that shoots from one stock
exchange to another, drives up share prices and drops them again like
dominoes. Globalisation is increased worldwide competition between
firms, firms which have plants all over the world and are hardly suscepti-
ble to influence by national governments any more. Globalisation is con-
sumer goods from all over the world in the supermarket. Globalisation is
people watching the news from all over the world on their television set,
telephoning and e-mailing far-away friends, going on holiday all over the
world. Globalisation is streetscapes in Europe, America and Asia which
you cannot teil apart; asphalt everywhere, everywhere the same cars, the
same neon signs of Coca Cola, McDonald's or Philips, people in a hurry
and youngsters on Nikes.
De Ruijter (1997, pp. 381-382) defined globalisation as technological
innovations in transport, automation and telecommunications resulting in
massive exchanges of people, goods, services and ideas. Markets and social
relations become worldwide. Standardisation of consumption and produc-
tion and homogenisation of society are the result. Events in one place are
quickly echoed in other parts on the globe. Globalisation is increasingly no
longer considered as a process, but as a characteristic of the "global sys-
tem": each particular entity has to be understood within the framework of
the world as a whole. A www of interdependencies has been spun
(DeRuijter 1997, p. 382).
There are, in fact, two views on globalisation (Schuurman 1997, p. 152).
The first sees globalisation as increased homogenisation and interdepen-
dency all over the world in the cultural, social and economie dimensions.
In this view, clearly identifiable centres give way to nodes which can differ
depending on time and dimension. For some authors the driving forces are
mostly socio-political, for others primarily economie, stemming from pro-
duction and markets. This is the view I have formulated above.
The second view, which I am inclined to support, sees a dialectical rela-
tionship between the global and the local, and is therefore sometimes
called "glocalisation". This view also identifies the trend towards global
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markets and politics, but notes an increased diversity and an increased
importance of regionalism and community as well. Cultural fragmenta-
tion, for example, with its reinvention of local traditions and identities, is
seen as an answer to the loss of identity through homogenisation.
"Localisation" is often limited to the social and cultural domains, but
Miyakawa (1998) has shown in his study of the Japanese automobile
industry that localisation proved to be indispensable to enable the indus-
try to outclass global competition.
Localisation, in his view, took the form of high-tech Investments in already
existing production areas of the Tokaido Megalopolis; through its connec-
tion with improvement (kaizan) movements; through the economies of
agglomeration between automobile producers and subcontractors; and
through the development of venture capital business in housing for work-
ers. This did not result in just another example of agglomeration efifects,
but in a distinct production environment. Foreign industries like
Volkswagen and Peugeot had no other choice but to settle there too
(Miyakawa 1998).
And there are more examples: one need only think of the distinctive posi-
tion the famous Silicon Valley occupies in the world of Information tech-
nology.
In the politica! domain globalisation is often perceived as the end of the
state. Some will point to the declining credibility of the welfare state,
because it was incapable of securing society against unemployment and
marginalisation. Others think that, with the completion of the welfare
state, its historical calling has been achieved and its role has become super-
fluous. Others again argue that the state is now being presented with the
account for years of nation building and the accompanying suppression of
identities.
The fact is that the restructuring of the welfare state with its privatisation
and deregulation has narrowed the activities of the state. It is also the fact
that structural adjustment programmes in many "low" and "middle-
income countries" had the same effect. Nor has the state succeeded in con-
trolling global markets. In the meantime, new regional and ethnic identi-
ties are being born or rising again: Belgium is federalising, Catalonia has
gained a large degree of autonomy, Nigeria creates every now and then a
new state in its federation and I do not need to elaborate about the Balkans
and the formet Soviel Union. Lastly, the democratisation that statted in
many "low-" and "middle-income countries" in the 1980s is accompanied
by decentralisation in an attempt to bring politica! power closer to the
people. Without exaggerating its effects, this also contributes to the decline
of state influence.
3.3 Livelihood and globalisation
With respect to livelihood strategies, globalisation may have two impor-
tant consequences: (1) because markets and social relations are becoming
worldwide, livelihood will become multi-local (2) because of glocalisation,
the importance of the international and the regional-local levels of scale
will increase to the detriment of the national level. These expectations are
illustrated by the following examples from Morocco and Kenya of success-
ful migrant networks and sustainable agricultural intensification.
Extensive migrant networks exist between various areas in Morocco,
including the oasis zone in the south, and Western Europe. Migration was
initially oriented towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands. "The first
reaction to the immigration policies in North-western Europe becoming
more rigorous, was the shift of emigration into the direction of Italy and
Spain" These countries too have now set limits on immigration. In order
to get around the strict immigration rules, the migrants have put in posi-
tion a whole range of inventive emigration methods. Regulär family reuni-
fication and new marriages are the most legal and secure methods.
"Besides, yearly many manage to enter Europe illegally. There are strong,
region-bound networks between emigrants in Europe and their regions of
origin, which stands surety for first care, housing and often work too..."
Although most migrants eventually do not return permanently to
Morocco, they send considerable sums of money to their family members
who stayed behind in the oasis". Many oasis inhabitants "have been able to
wrest themselves because of this from feudal relations, servitude and pover-
ty that used to rule. Emigration has contributed positively to the level of
living, housing and social status of most of the oasis inhabitants. This had
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a strong emancipatory effect..." In some oases modern agriculture has
expanded signifïcantly. Migrants and remittances are at the basis of the
purchase of motor pumps, mechanisation and colonisation of the desert.
In the Sahara a new green frontier seems to be emerging (DeHaas 1999).
Successful agricultural intensification in Kenya is documented by Tiffin et
al. (1994). "They use photographs from the 1930s that show severely
eroded landscapes in the former native reserve of Machakos. 240.000
people lived there at that time. In 1990 the population had risen to 1.4
million. The area of land per capita diminished from 2.6 ha to less than l
ha. However, pictures taken at the same spots now, show a prosperous
countryside with terraces, trees, coffee shrubs and farms. Between 1930
and 1987 yields per ha increased 6 times. The value of production against
constant prices rose ten times and value per capita three times.
The success story began in the colonial period with the forced construc-
tion of terraces and the introduction of ploughs by Kenyan soldiers return-
ing from the Second World War in India. But the boom in soil conserva-
tion started after independence: when compulsion disappeared; the terrac-
ing work was implemented by traditional working parties, and women,
because of labour migration of men to Nairobi, started to play a leading
role. Much organic manure is now used. The cattle that used to be collec-
tively herded are now kept in private byres, fodder is grown and improved
breeds of dairy cattle are used. The extended families of the past have
become the nuclear families of the present and the status of women has
improved considerably.
According to the authors, the initiative for this metamorphosis came from
the local people, who reshaped their livelihoods on the basis of their own
needs, insights and knowledge. In doing so, they used their revenues from
coffee cultivation and remittances from migration, and chose from a range
of skills, schooling, support for soil and water conservation and new crops
(introduced by participatory technology development) offered by the gov-
ernment and a number of donors. Facilitating the functioning of markets
and the privatisation of landownership were the main achievements of the
Kenyan government.... It remains unclear if the whole population has
equally participated in and profited from this intensification, or that there
have been drop outs, marginalisation of certain groups have occurred etc."
(De Haan 1999).
The example of migrant network shows that Brookfïeld's "nested hierar-
chy" of levels of scale is decreasingly in accord with reality. Locations of
livelihood are increasingly no longer connected to each other by vertical,
hierarchical lines that converge in an upper hierarchical level. Instead, they
are increasingly connected by direct horizontal lines which are, moreover,
becoming increasingly longer. Consequently, the structuring of flelds of
action, as discussed in section 2, becomes therefore increasingly multi-
local.
Is this also the end of territoriality as one of the organising principles of
society and, at the same time, the end of the territory, the bounded space
inhabited and structured by a human group, that exerts a certain authori-
ty over it? According to Conti and Giaccaria (1998, p. 18) the concept of
internationalisation still implies the overcoming of boundaries. They argue
that internationalisation is a concept that considers the world as a differ-
entiated set of areas, hierarchically structured as in Brookfield's "nested
hierarchy". In their view, globalisation refers not only to the loss of power
by nation states, but also to a changing perception of national and inter-
national levels of scale by actors. With respect to territoriality, therefore,
globalisation is a qualitatively new step. Through globalisation, national
boundaries become blurred, but local Systems, i.e. regions, but without
clear-cut physical or administrative boundaries, remain. Those local sys-
tems (or regions) will become fully-fledged parts of a global system instead
of hierarchically subordinated sub-units. For example, some people have
argued that the Machakos case is not representative of Africa. Because of
its Situation near Nairobi, its bimodal rainfall regime and the availability
of uncultivated land, the region is considerably better off than other parts
of Africa. However, from a localisation perspective, Machakas is indeed
representative, or rather "exemplary". lts success in achieving a more sus-
tainable livelihood emerged from a specific constellation of: population
pressure; local knowledge enriched with experiences from outside even as
far from India; profitable world market integration by coffee cultivation;
multi-locality in livelihood strategies thanks to migration; social capita! of
self-help groups; and enabling government policies. The example of
Machakos cannot therefore simply be duplicated elsewhere.14)
Globalisation means that, in our perception of processes of inclusion and
exclusion in multiple livelihood strategies, the different levels of scale both
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in vital "capitals" and in structure come closer to each other and perhaps
even fuse. Distant actors also come nearer. While the arena becomes
increasingly global and livelihood strategies become more homogenous,
certain local/regional characteristics of the arena remain or will even
become more marked, and livelihood strategies will need to become more
specific (see fig. 11).
(Fig. 11 - Sustainable Livelihood in the era of globalisation)
Globalisation looks like a new round with new opportunities for liveli-
hood, but it is doubtful whether social exclusion will then become a thing
of the past. The question then arises of what can be the role of governance
in this respect. Referring to its role in sustainable livelihood, Hyden (1998,
p. 6.) defines governance as the "measures that involve setting rules for the
exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules". This also means
that governance determines how and at what level of interest there is
deliberation between the interests of, for example, a Community of
marginalised peasants and a few rare animals. According to Hyden (1998,
pp. 13-14), governance should promote sustainable livelihood and prevent
social exclusion by (1) nurturing local initiatives, (2) reinforcing civil rights
(3) improving the quality of relations between actors, notably in the field
of trust and reciprocity, in other words, enlarging social capital and (4)
reinforcing the incomes of poor households, including the reorganisation
of taxation and public expenditure at the local level - if necessary, through
non-governmental informal community-based organisations where local
government is too weak. Hyden is in fact making a plea for a shift of the
core of governance to the local level. This again demonstrates the increased
importance of localisation.
denying the usefulness of governance at the national level or insisting that
the state as a platform for emancipation (Schuurman 1999) has had its
day, we can also find interesting developments in governance at the other
extreme, i.e. at the global level. Lubbers and Koorevaar (1999) thinks that
the stitches that the national state has dropped or has had to drop in globa-
lisation, should be taken up by some sort of "global governance". Global
governance consists of global co-ordination by supra-regional and interna-
tional governmental institutions of national governments balanced by an
emerging international "civil society" consisting of global NGOs of envi-
ronmental conservationists, voters, believers, consumers etc. Both have a
task in the regulation of markets, notably the control of transnational firms
operating on the global market. He makes a plea, in fact, for a new kind
of (global) governance emerging from a symbiosis between governments,
transnational firms and global civil society.
The future of development cooperation must also be viewed in this global
perspective. Development cooperation has undoubtedly contributed to
globalisation of markets and Investments, but this does not mean, of
course, that it can be dispensed with (Hoebink 1997). It is precisely the
humanitarian side of development cooperation with its immunisation and
literacy campaigns, housing programmes and valued elements such as the
provision of micro-credit and debts rescheduling, that can be seen as a step
of global social security.
At fïrst sight, the era of globalisation seems to pass by Bake's livelihood
strategies. I made clear that her income did not exceed $1 a day, which
placed her among the excluded of this world. However, it has become clear
in the course of my presentation that she is not excluded. She has over-
come her exclusion from milk distribution by producing cheese and to
make cheese she had to overcome the traditions of her people. That was so
successful that now all women in her camp produce cheese.
Bake's livelihood strategies mainly took place in a local arena. Because she
participated in different local interest groups (her extended family in the
camp; her uncle's household in the city; the group of cheese producers) she
was able to become successful.
Whether her livelihood will be sustainable on the long run, it is too early
to say. That depends on a number of factors that she cannot influence. An
increase in the milk supply depends on rainfall, the size of the herds and
the commercial orientation of herders. Only the latter may be influenced
by demand from the cheese makers. The demand for cheese depends on
the growth in incomes in the region. A rise in her own productivity
depends on technological Investments for which she needs credit. And that
is only the part that concerns her cheese production. She has never
attended classes, she has to walk far to obtain clean drinking water and
medical care is expensive and of poor quality.
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Nevertheless, the globalisation of her livelihood strategies has already
started. The Maggi cubes she buys come from Senegal; the rice for a feast
from Thailand or Pakistan; her matches and her husband's bicycle from
Nigeria. As a result of booming cotton exports, the economy of Bake's
region is expanding fast. Even her husband now cultivates cotton. The sus-
tainability of that economie growth partly depends on the success of the
privatisation of cotton marketing in Benin, on the negotiations in the
WTO and on the opening up of a niche market in Europe for organic
cotton from Benin. Representatives of an NGO of Fulani from the city are
active in Bake's local politica! arena. They organise cultural festivals and
literacy campaigns and hope to give a voice to the Fulani in the process of
administrative decentralisation which is slowly getting under way. They are
working hard on raising their people and en passant on moulding a
Beninese Fulani identity to serve as a glue in the recruitment of their
political rank and file. Their contacts extend to donors and scientific
institutions in Europe.
In Boureima's livelihood strategies, the fusion between different levels of
scale in vital "capitals" and structure is already apparent. Because of boom-
ing cotton exports, farmers are now investing in draught animals and new
groups of suppliers and buyers, each with their specific impact, are appear-
ing on the cattle market. Market Organisation in Northern Benin is
becoming more formal and transparent. For Boureima it is still a more or
less open question äs to what his cattle will be worth in Cotonou or Lomé
upon his arrival. His colleagues in Burkina Faso are already much better
informed about prices on the markets of Abidjan in Ivory Coast, because
of better lines of communication on that side. They are able to react much
more quickly than Boureima, partly because formalities at the Burkina-
Ivory Coast border have become quicker and transparent after structural
adjustment, so that the need for smuggling disappeared.
A few years ago it looked as if traders like Boureima and, with him, cattle
keepers in West Africa would face serious competition from imports of
frozen, subsidised meat from the European Union. This meat was taken
out of the European market at guaranteed prices to farmers. For Boureima
it was false alarm, because Benin imported very little meat. Elsewhere in
West Africa, too, traders and cattle keepers suffered few losses, because the
frozen meat was of inferior quality and was therefore bought by consumers
who never bought Sahelian meat . Nevertheless a short, one-sided, public-
ity campaign by European NGOs was sufficient to cause the European
Union to change tack. One of the positive after-effects was the financing,
inter alia, by the European Union, of a monitoring System of cattle and
meat prices in West Africa that has contributed to more transparent mar-
kets.
Boureima's and even Bake's arenas of livelihood strategies have thus
become increasingly global: distant actors are coming nearer and levels of
scale in vital "capitals" and even in structure are fusing. However, if we
consider Bake in particular: the opportunities for her to sustain her liveli-
hood and thus guarantee her social inclusion do not seem more gloomy
than "before" globalisation15).
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Chapter 4 - Implications for the Centre for
International Development Issues
Nijmegen
tO
If the Third World no longer exists, the Third World Centre is in need of
a new name and a new mission. It is of the utmost importance that
development studies, to improve the understanding of how a sustainable
livelihood can be achieved in a globalising era, should continue. As I said
above, development studies, should have a normative preoccupation with
the poor and the marginalised. I think this goes in particular for develop-
ment studies in this university. Our university's identity is based on
solidarity, respect and sharing, which are par excellence our values too.
From the conceptual model "sustainable livelihood in a global era", which
I have just outlined our research agenda can be easily derived:
• With respect to access: what vital "capitals", human, natural, physical,
Financial and social, do actors, both individuals and social groups, have at
their disposal to shape their livelihood; which structural factors shape
access, how do actors acquire access to those vital "capitals; how important
is social capita! as compared to the other vital "capitals?
• With respect to multipleness: which livelihood strategies are distin-
guished; which interest groups figure in the livelihood arena; how do
actors manage to be part of different interest groups?
• With respect to vulnerability: how dynamic are livelihood strategies, that
is, how do they adapt to temporary and more permanent shocks and
stresses; what temporary coping strategies do different actors develop and
how do these become more permanent adaptive strategies?
• With respect to multi-locality: how multi-local are livelihood strategies;
do vital capitals fuse at different levels of scale; how does the structuring of
fields of action develops?
• With respect to social inclusion and exclusion: how do they work out
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with respect to different dimensions of multiple livelihood strategies; how
are actors' livelihood strategies influenced by structures through the vital
"capitals" they use; what role does agency play as the hinge between actor
and structure; do actors' livelihood strategies change structures?
• Do structures fuse at different levels of scale? Is the national level losing
ground to the benefit of both local/regional and global levels? Are process-
es of inclusion and exclusion becoming more homogeneous and more spe-
cific at the same time? Is global governance developing into a global social
security or safety net System and is it capable of preventing social exclu-
sionr
These questions will be at the focus of the research programme of what will
now be called the "Centre for International Development Issues
(CIDIN)". As a consequence our future research will have to become
increasingly:
• Multi-dimensional because livelihood strategies are multiple. In addi-
tion, we will have to make an effort to go beyond the type of research that
concentrates only on facets and micro-levels (Kleinpenning 1997).
Because of their interdisciplinary nature, development studies are capable
of achieving this.
• Because livelihood strategies in a globalising era take place at different
locations, our research has to be multi-local too, i.e. will increasingly have
to take place simultaneously in different places. This makes high demands
on both the Organisation and techniques of the research and on the
researchers.
• Moreover, our research will have to be comparative if it aims to draw
conclusions about globalisation and globalisation-localisation trends (De
Haanl999; Blaikie and De Haan 1998). If markets and social relations are
supposed to become worldwide, then our research has to be global, too.
One thinks first, of course, of comparative studies analysing similarities
and increased diversity in "middle" and "low income countries". But the
Third World no longer exists and an exclusive orientation on these "mid-
dle" and "low" income countries therefore misses the point of globalisa-
tion.To understand the processes of inclusion and exclusion in livelihood
in the era of globalisation, similar and connected processes must be stud-
ied across the globe in "low-income", "middle-income" and "high-income
countries", in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America, in Eastern and Western
Europe, in the former Soviet Union etc. Scepticism about the possibilities
of such comparative studies is inappropriate. I think that development
researchers underestimate the potential of their experience and skills in a
glocalising world.
"For example, I managed a number of times to interest Dutch planners
and policy makers in African experiences with local environmental mana-
gement by village committee, which have powers Dutch neighbourhood
safety projects can only dream of (De Haan 1997b). Recently, Dutch
jurists have started, together with Beninese researchers, to become
acquainted with informal, Beninese types of conflict resolution, often
based on customary law, in order to contribute to the development in the
Netherlands of forms of self-regulation and alternative conflict resolution
(cf. De Haan 1998e).
Interesting comparisons could also be made between conflicts in the
tropical rain forest of Cameroon involving local people, timber companies
and the department of forestry (and possibly also the World Wildlife
Fund) and those in the Gelderse Vallei between pig farmers, city dwellers
seeking recreation, the ministry of agriculture and conservation founda-
tions around the ROM (Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu) spatial and envi-
ronmental project." (De Haan 1999). Poverty studies in the Netherlands
and studies of informal social security Systems elsewhere in the world have
the same comparative potential.
• This does not mean that development studies should throw themselves
into the Netherlands and Western Europe, although Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union do seem to be interesting new study areas to me.
But, it does mean that CIDIN has to look for strategie co-operation
alliances. It will be important to couple research in order to arrive at com-
parative research projects which take contrasting livelihood strategies as a
point of departure, to shed more light on certain aspects of multi-locality,
43
multiplicity and fusing levels of scale. It would be interesting to undertake
studies which concentrate on the sometimes striking resemblance of his-
torical processes in Western Europe and present processes in Eastern
Europe or Africa16). However, it would be even more important to under-
take comparative studies in order to Highlight current coherence in the
processes of social inclusion and exclusion in each area. It goes without say-
ing that historical depth and a regional perspective will prove their useful-
ness in this respect (Kleinpenning 1997). It is important therefore to esta-
blish strenger linkages between our research and that of others in the
faculty (NOM AND INSOCO), in the University of Nijmegen (NICCOS)
and in the national research school (CERES).
• Our new name, Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen
(CIDIN), expresses our new global orientation. However, what remains is
a research and training community in development studies. That com-
munity is made up of staffand undergraduates, post-graduate students and
alumni. We will try more than before to keep in touch with each other in
order to work together and to learn from each others experience. The uni-
versity is a unity of research, education and training, as our former Rector
Magnificus rightly pointed out in his valedictory address (Van Els 1999).
As far as the study of globalisation is concerned, our research and training
community has a tremendous potential in itself. Our students carry out
fïeldwork all over the world, our graduates work not only with numerous
development organisations abroad, but also at development agencies in the
Netherlands, in social security departments, in the immigration service etc.
Modern information and communication technology will help us to coop-
erate more intensively than before and to become a solid research and
training community. What has been said with respect to our research pro-
gramme about multi-dimensionality, multi-locality, comparativeness and
new research areas, goes for the training programme and for student field-
work too.
• I want to state explicitly that it is our task to cooperate intensively with
foreign students, lecturers and researchers. CIDIN must involve them in
its research and training community: We will be a hospitable basis for
foreign colleagues, just as we are always received with hospitality during
our fïeldwork abroad. Moreover, I think that internationalisation means
also that our foreign guests should also have the opportunity to study for
themselves globalisation in the Netherlands.
The Dutch government concluded some daring treaties, known as the
Sustainable Development Treaties, a few years ago with Bhutan, Costa
Rica and Benin. These treaties were designed to express joint responsibility
for worldwide sustainable development as agreed upon at the Environment
and Development Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. I describe them
as daring because one of their underlying principles is "reciprocity". It was
foreseeable that such a principle would immediately cause Dutch politi-
cians to take fright. The Ecooperation foundation in Amsterdam, which
has been implementing the treaties during the past few years, has therefore
encountered a lot of scorn. I experienced this at first hand as coördinator
of university cooperation with Benin. I found the criticism undeserved and
short-sighted at that point, because reciprocity should be an important
source of Inspiration in development cooperation. I have just explained
how trust and reciprocity constitute the basic elements of social capital and
how social capital is one of the pillars of sustainable livelihood. In a global-
ising world, social capital and, therefore, reciprocity are indispensable. This
is why you will find downstairs a exhibition that tries to capture that prin-
ciple in photographs from the four partner countries of Bhutan, Costa
Rica, Benin and the Netherlands.
• Reciprocity should also be the basic principle of our research and train-
ing community in development studies. Reciprocity is in a nutshell how
we, at the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen, will put
into practice our university's identity. We, as researchers and students will
work together with our partners over there. We do not work for excluded
people, but with them; not only over there, but here, too; we do not only
teach them, but learn from them, too. Il faut maintenir la solidarité, réduire
la dependance et agrandir la réciprocité.
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5 - Word of Thanks (summary)
At the end of this presentation I wish to express my gratitude to:
the Stichtingsbestuur and the College van Bestuur of the Katholieke
Universiteit Nijmegen and the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for
entrusting me with the chair of development studies;
the Rector Magnificus, I particularly welcome your plans as announced in
your inaugural address last December;
the students (including the postgraduale students and alumni), you are our
core business and I would like us to shape the training and research com-
munity of development studies together;
my colleagues of CIDIN, the Centre for International Development Issues
Nijmegen: thank you for your welcome and for your support in develop-
ing new directions in research and training;
my colleagues of the Faculty of Social Sciences, especially those in anthro-
pology, for their welcome;
Professors Hüsken, Borsboom, Jansen and Wolters and Dr. Hollander: I
hope to develop close links with you in research and training;
Professor De Ruiter, this applies to the CERES national research school,
too;
my colleagues of NICCOS and in particular dr. Van Naerssen: I also hope
to establish research links with you;
Professor van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, my promotor;
Professor Dietz and all my former colleagues at the University of
Amsterdam Inauguration, for the good times we had in Amsterdam: we
will continue our cooperation;
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Professor Boko and all colleagues at the National University of Benin, espe-
cially CIFRED, the Centre Interfacultaire de Formation et de Recherche
en Environnement pour Ie Développement Durable: we will continue to
explore the opportunities for reciprocity;
the "éminences grises" of Dutch geography of developing countries:
Professor Hinderink, for teaching me geography; Professor DeBruijne, for
bemg my mentor in Amsterdam and giving me room to develop my
research and teaching experience; Professor Kleinpenning, for your trust
and warm welcome in Nijmegen;
my sons Jubi and Guus, for your support and understanding;
my dearest Ineke, for your everlasting love.
WORD OF THANKS
6 - Notes
I acknowledge receiving valuable, challenging and encouraging comments
on an earlier draft of this text from a number of people, including the staff
of the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen. I would like
to thank Ad, Annelies, Deborah, Detlev, Föns, Francien, Frans, Guus,
Hans, Ineke, Jaap, Jubi, Klaus, Lau, Laurens, Luuk, Marleen, Paul, Rietje,
Théophile, Tine and Wilbert for suggestions and help. Robert Symonds
corrected my not always perfect English. The customary disclaimer, of
course, applies.
(D
The life histories of Bake Machou and other women are beautifully por-
trayed by Deborah IJsendijk in her Masters thesis on the Human
Geography of Developing Countries at the University of Amsterdam,
completed in 1999. We Dance in our Own Way ... Livelihood Strategies of
Fulbe Women and Change in Northern Benin analyses the coping strategies
of Fulani (or Fulbe) women selling milk and producing cheese in relation
to milk availability and access to milk. I am grateful to Deborah for allow-
ing me to use one of her case studies and illustrations.
(2)
The case of Boureima is animatedly presented by Dr. Paul Quarles van
Ufford in an article in Dutch in Geografie in 1999. He completed his
research project on the structure of cattle trade and cattle markets in Benin
and the strategies of cattle traders in 1999 with an excellent and com-
pelling Ph.D. thesis in geography entitled Trade and Traders. The Making
of the Cattle Market in Benin. The study examines how West African cattle
traders, by using their economie, social and ideological capital, play a sub-
stantial role in the transformation of markets. It explored interactions
between actors and structure using a variety of methodological tools,
including analysis of supply, demand and prices, of trade flows and trad-
er's accumulation paths and trade, business and labour networks. Various
life histories of traders are portrayed. I am indebted to Paul Quarles van
Ufford for allowing me to use this case study and illustrations.
NOTES
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(3)
I am obliged to Jaap van Dokkum for skilfully compiling and drawing the
world maps and figures illustrating this text.
(4)
See both DeBruijne "the gap must be fundamental if it relativises so
strongly these differences" (1977, p. 13) and Kleinpenning (1978, pp.22-
23) pointing at the diversity of the Third World.
(5)
Huizer referred to the same figures in his farewell speech (1999, p.11).
(6)
I am aware that in the debate on sustainability of livelihoods often an
environmental extension is added. In those cases (cf. Scoones 1998, p.5)
"sustainable" not only equates social inclusion but "not undermining the
natural resource base" as well. However, I feel this extension puts much
emphasis on the natural environment, whereas socio-economic aspects are
of equal importance. Environmental sustainability is included in "satisfac-
tion of self-defined basic needs" and does not have to be stressed separately.
(7)
Although this typology in five vital "capitals" is exclusive to me, I am aware
that other authors discern other "capitals" depending on their specific
interests and divergent definitions. I include Bourdieu's "symbolic capital",
prestige and status, in social capital. Klaus Hoven brought to my attention
Cees Hamelink's (1999, p. 109) characterisation of "information capital",
meaning the total of financial capacity to bear the costs of internet access
and use, the technical capability to use the internet infrastructure, the
intellectual capacity to filter and evaluate information, the motivation to
search actively for information and, finally, the capacity to use information
in social life. Following Grégroire and Labazée (1993, cited in Quarles van
UfFord 1999b, p. 22), who pointed to the ideological conditions, notably
religion, for trade in Africa, Quarles van Ufford (1999b, p. 264) uses
"ideological capital" as a reinterpretation of symbolic capital, adding religion
and ethnic identity.
(8)
In this respect the work of the IDS Environmental Entitlements Research
Team is noteworthy. Laurens Nijzink brought to my attention a volume of
the IDS Bulletin. Herein, Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1997, p.9) explain
the concept of "environmental entitlements, (which) refer to alter-
native sets of benefits derived from environmental goods and services (cf.
natural capitals as one of the vital capitals - LdH) over which people have
legitimate effective command and which are instrumental in achieving
well-being". "Entitlements in turn enhance people's capabilities, which are
what people can do or be with their entitlements".
In Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999, p.240) they analyse the role of insti-
tutions in community-based natural resource management. "In focussing
attention on the mapping processes by which components of heteroge-
neous environments become endowments and entitlements of particular
social actors" they provide a dynamic perspective on the role of institu-
tions.
(9)
In Le poisson est devenu du mil Antje van Driel skilfully examines the
changes in livelihood triggered by a period of relative drought in the Niger
valley of Benin. The most important livelihood Systems were those of
Dendi agro-fishermen and Fulani agro-pastoralists, who both used alter-
nately the floodplain for fishing and grazing. With decreasing rainfall and
dramatically lowered water tables in the river, the fish yields of the Dendi
dwindled. However, the same cause gave birth to excellent new farming
lands in the floodplain. The Dendi successfully adapted their livelihood
strategies to the stififer environmental conditions by concentrating on agri-
culture. "Where the herds once grazed and the fisherman fished, the land
is now used for farming ...." The Fulani have to look for pastures elsewhere
and also come increasingly into conflict with farmers because their herds
cause damage to the encroaching fields when they try to reach watering
places and pastures in the floodplain (Van Driel 1998). We may say that
the Fulani still represent the "coping with drought" case and not yet that
of adaptation.
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(10)
I think this is also the crux of Huizer's work on the long tradition of peas-
ant movements in Latin America resisting exploitation by large landown-
ers (cf. Huizer 1970 and Van der Velden and Hoebink 1999).
(H)
Both Detlev Haude and Frans Schuurman drew my attention to a long
debate in the 1980s about the nature of strategie groups. The notion was
introduced in the development debate (or should I say "discourse") in
Benin by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, who indeed derived the con-
cept from Evers and Schiel. The latter presented it to analyse the process
of class formation in Southeast Asia. According to Evers and Schiel (1988,
pp. 10-25), strategie groups are made up of persons having a common
identity, a certain degree of interna! Organisation and active implementa-
tion of political and economie goals, especially stimulated by situations of
conflict. In daily development parlance the notion of strategie groups
refers to all kind of interest groups which people may be part of simulta-
neously.
(12)
In referring to Berry, Gore raises a point which needs to be looked into fur-
ther (Berry 1998: in Gore 1994, p. 12). According to Berry, it is not social
exclusion that is a current problem in Africa, but "rather the opposite - the
fact that many Africans have become locked into multiple channels of
access and strategies of resource management which perpetuate low pro-
ductivity. But, partly as a result of low productivity and agrarian crisis, it
may be that in the long run, increasing numbers of impoverished rural
people simply divest themselves, intentionally or no, of membership of
access-controlling institutions and thereby form a new category of the dis-
possessed".
(13)
In an excellent book on Pastoralism in a GlobalAge, Fred Zaal has analysed
the changing livelihoods of two well-known pastoral groups in Africa, the
Maasai in Kenya and the Fulani in Burkina Faso, showing the relevance of
market conditions for grain and livestock with which both groups are con-
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fronted. Thanks to favourable market conditions, poor Fulani manage to
survive, although they are expected to become increasingly marginalised.
For richer livestock keepers, especially in Kenya, the importance of com-
mercial production will rise, but their vulnerability to terms of trade is
expected to diminish (Zaal 1998).
(14)
De Bruijne, Dietz and Verrest (1999, p.42) put it this way: "globalisation
and localisation result in a larger number of constantly shifting regions,
each with its own specificity of nature, pace and direction of economie,
social and cultural change, and in respect of spatial arrangements and land
use
(15)
However, Schalkwijk and De Bruijne (1999) have observed a clear, posi-
tive effect of globalisation on livelihood. They describe the case of Mea, a
women living with her man and children in a backstreet courtyard in
Paramaribo, Surinam. He is a fisherman and often away from home. She
does not have an income of her own, however she knows how to organise
support. When, in 1996, she was asked if her Situation was worse than 10
years before she answered without hesitating: "No, in 1986 I did not have
family in the Netherlands, but now I have my mother, a sister and a
brother over there. They send me gifts for the children, shoes and clothes".
Even her fridge comes from the Netherlands. Her poor household depends
for extra's on support from abroad.
(16)
Hüsken, for example, has made an exemplary comparison of the historical
development of the modern bureaucratie state and its impact on peasants
and villagers in two different parts of the globe, i.e. the Gondosari in Java
and Groesbeek (known for its history of smuggling) near Nijmegen.
Confrontations between foresters and villagers followed a similar pattern
and had remarkably similar outcomes" (Hüsken 1997, p. 257).
Strikingly, Internationale Samenwerking, the magazine of the information
service of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation also recently
published an article under the headline that the Dutch province of
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Drenthe in the year 1949, the year that Dutch development aid started,
resembled the present "Third World" (Internationale Samenwerking Sept.
1999). Some respondents in that article did not agree with the compari-
son, a disagreement that mainly reflected their own perceptions of present-
day low-income countries. According to Internationale Samenwerking, the
crisis in the peat market, which resulted in low wages and poverty, poor
housing, export of profits, and paternalistic (government) aid in those
days, resembled the present Situation in low-income countries.
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